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SALVAGING PROPORTIONATE
PRISON SENTENCING: A REPLY TO
RUMMEL V. ESTELLE

American prison sentences as authorized by statute are among
the longest in the world. 1 Courts have used the eighth amendment's proscription of "cruel and unusual punishments,"2 however, to mitigate the harshness of excessively long sentences, on
the theory that the amendment prohibits prison terms grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime. 3 For decades, the
Supreme Court has recognized this disproportionality limitation
on criminal sanctions,• and, until recently, permitted eighth
amendment challenges to punishment regardless of the crime involved or penalty imposed. 11 In Rummel u. Estelle, 6 though, the
1. See ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 57 (1968).
2. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
3. See, e.g., Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir.) (30- to 60-year sentence for
marijuana possession), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 993 (1975); Hart v. Coiner,
483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973) (life sentence imposed under state recidivism statute following defendant's conviction for three separate offenses: writing a $50 check on insufficient
funds, transporting $140 in forged checks across state lines, and perjury), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 938 (1974); Thacker v. Garrison, 445 F. Supp. 376 (W.D.N.C. 1978) (48- to 50year sentence imposed following conviction for safecracking); Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F.
Supp. 444 (W.D. Va. 1977) (40-year sentence imposed following conviction for possession
with intent to distribute, and distribution of, less than nine ounces of marijuana), rev'd
sub nom. Hutto v. Davis, 102 S. Ct. 703 (1982) (per curiam); People v. Lorentzen, 387
Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972) (20-year minimum sentence imposed following conviction for sale of marijuana); see also In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 217 (1972) (one-year-to-life sentence imposed following second conviction for indecent exposure, relying on California Constitution).
4. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) ("it is a precept of justice
that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense"); accord
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (a penalty violates the eighth amendment if
"grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime"). For a discussion of the proportionality principle as a constitutional limitation on punishment, see Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989 (1978); Wheeler, Towards a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838 (1972).
.
5. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (challenging death sentence for the
rape of an adult woman); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (reviewing imposition of
death penalty for murder); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (eighth amend-
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Court suggested that proportionality principles do not limit the
permissible length of prison terms levied on felons, because "the
length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter
of legislative prerogative."7 The Court in Rummel, therefore,
shielded statutorily imposed prison sentences from constitutional scrutiny in all but the most egregious cases. 8
Although the reasoning of Rummel will thus be dispositive of
eighth amendment challenges to sentence length brought under
the federal constitution, state courts remain free to depart from
the Supreme Court's analysis in interpreting state constitutional
corollaries to the federal proscription of cruel and unusual punishment. Indeed, several state courts already have rejected the
Rummel approach in construing the scope of protection against
severe punishment afforded by their state constitutions.9 Accordingly, the arguments advanced in Rummel demand critical
attention. Part I of this Note provides a capsule of the Court's
holding in Rummel. Part II argues, contrary to Rummel, that
precedential support can be mustered to support eighth amendment review of sentence length. Finally, part 11,1 discusses the
continued viability of the proportionality test as a vehicle for
assessing challenges to the length of imprisonment, and discounts the concerns voiced in Rummel regarding the difficulty of
judicial review of legislative sentencing decisions.

I. THE

SUPREME COURT'S REJECTION OF PROPORTIONALITY
REVIEW

In Rummel v. Estelle, the Supreme Court confronted the
troubling question of whether a legislatively mandated life sentence could be found violative of the eighth amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment. William Rummel
had committed a series of felonious property offenses in Texas
involving less than $230. 10 After being convicted of his third felment attack upon punishment comprising 12 years at hard labor plus the 1088 of many
civil rights for the crime of falsifying a public document).
6. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
7. Id. at 274.
8. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., State v. McDaniel, 228 Kan. 172, 612 P.2d 123 (1980) (sentence of 5 to 20
years for aggravated robbery); Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 427 N.E.2d 17 (Mass. 1981)
(sentence of 40 to 50 years for p088ession of a machine gun); State v. Fain, 94 Wash. 387,
617 P.2d 720 (1980) (life sentence under habitual offender statute where underlying convictions involved use of fraud to obtain less than $470).
10. Rummel was convicted in 1964 of fraudulently using a credit card to obtain $80
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ony, for theft by false pretext,1 1 Rummel was sentenced to life
imprisonment under the Texas "habitual offender" statute. 11
Following the affirmance of his conviction in state court,18 Rummel pursued habeas corpus review
the federal courts, alleging
that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
Rummel premised his claim for habeas relief not upon the invalidity of the Texas habitual offender statute - which had previously been found constitutional14 - but rather upon the argument that the statute as applied to him 111 violated the eighth
amendment because the sentence was grossly disproportionate
to his crime. 16
The Supreme Court, affirming the lower courts, 17 rejected
Rummel's contentions, finding the eighth amendment propor-

in

worth of goods and was sentenced to three years in the state penitentiary. Five years
later, he was sentenced to four years in prison for passing a forged check for $28.36.
Rummel was found guilty a third time in 1973, for the felony of obtaining $120.75 by
false pretenses. 445 U.S. at 265-66. Ironically, Rummel was convicted of a fourth felony
concurrently with being sentenced to life imprisonment under the provisions of the
Texas habitual offender statute. See Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 659 (5th Cir.
1978), aff'd, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
11. Subsequent to Rummel's felony conviction for theft by false pretext, Texas reclassified the offense as a misdemeanor. See 'I'Ex. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(d)(3) (Supp.
1980); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 295 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
12. The statute provided: "Whoever shall have been three times convicted of a felony
less than capital shall on such third conviction be imprisoned for life in the penitentiary." TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 63 (Vernon 1962) (current version at 'I'Ex. PENAL
CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974)). For a general discussion of recidivist statutes, see Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes Permitting Increased Sentences for
Habitual or Dangerous Criminals, 89 HARV. L. REv. 356 (1975).
13. See Rummel v. State, 509 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
14. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
15. The Supreme Court has held that a facially valid statute may be violative of the
Constitution when applied in a particular case. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963) (state statute prohibiting breach of the peace violated the first amendment when invoked against participants in a demonstration).
Appellate courts occasionally have overturned statutorily permissible sentences on the
basis of an abuse of discretion by the sentencing judge. See, e.g., Woosley v. United
States, 478 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1973) (vacating as an abuse of discretion a five-year sentence imposed for refusing induction into the military service). Rummel, however, could
not allege an abuse of discretion by the sentencing judge, because the life sentence was
mandated by statute.
16. Rummel was not sentenced to life imprisonment for obtaining money by false
pretenses; under Texas law, the maximum penalty for that offense was 10 years imprisonment. TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. art. 1421 (repealed 1973), reprinted in 'I'Ex. PENAL CODE
ANN. app. (Vernon 1974). Rather, the life sentence stemmed from the provisions of the
Texas habitual offender statute. See supra note 12.
17. The federal district court had denied Rummel's petition for habeas relief without
holding a hearing, but was reversed by a divided circuit court panel. Rummel v. Estelle,
568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reheard
Rummel's case en bane and affirmed the district court's denial of relief. Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978).
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tionality principle 18 inapplicable to the punishment Texas had
imposed. 19 The Court thereby had established a broad-based
principle. Decisions regarding lengths of felony prison sentences
would be entrusted to the discretion of the legislature,10 with the
exception of "exceedingly rare" cases11 such as the imposition of
a life sentence for the felony of overtime parking21 - which the
Court acknowledged but made no attempt to define. 13
The, Court's conclusion that it would eschew proportionality
review of prison terms imposed on felons stemmed from two distinct propositions. First, the Court did not find precedential
support for Rummel's position that eighth amendment proportionality principles were meant to apply to the length of prison
sentences.14 Second, the Court reasoned that assessing the pro18. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
19. The Court split 5-4. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Blackmun. Justice Stewart also
filed a concurring opinion. Justice Powell, dissenting, was joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, ·and Stevens.
20. See 445 U.S. at 274 ("[O]ne could argue without fear of contradiction by any
decision of this Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies
. . . the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative
prerogative.").
21. See Hutto v. Davis, 102 S. Ct. 703, 705 (1982) (per curiam) ("Rummel stands for
the proposition that 'successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences'
should be 'exceedingly rare'.") (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272). In several cases decided before Davis, state and lower federal courts had adopted a similar view of Rummel's meaning. See, e.g., Britton v. Rogers, 631 F.2d 572, 578 (8th Cir. 1980) (length of a
felony prison sentence reviewable only on "extreme facts"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939
(1981); accord Hayes v. Bordenkircher, 621 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1980); State v. Smith, 275
S.C. 164, 268 S.E.2d 276 ,(1980). Other courts, when faced with a statute mandating a
particular punishment, have found Rummel to dictate that any deviation from the statutory penalty is a matter for the legislature. See Comstock v. State, 406 N.E.2d 1164 (Ind.
1980) (recidivist statute); State v. Jones, 298 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa 1980) (statute governing
consecutive sentences).
22. 445 U.S. at 274 n.11.
23. Thus, it is impossible to predict how the Court will react to particular cases that
might be considered within the "exceedingly rare" category. Indeed, Hutto v. Davis, 102
S. Ct. 703 (1982) (per curiam), the first Supreme Court case decided under Rummel,
provides no insight into this problem; as the dissent observed, the Court made no attempt to analyze why the defendant's case was not "exceedingly rare." Id. at 710 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices, however, argued that three features placed
the case in that category. Defendant Davis had been convicted and sentenced to two
consecutive 20-year terms for possession with intent to distribute and distribution of
marijuana, the evidence consisting of less than nine ounces of marijuana found in his
home. The dissent found Davis' situation "exceedingly rare" because his sentence was
"in cruel and painful excess of the punishments imposed by the Virginia courts" for
similar offenses. Id. at 710-11. Moreover, the prosecutor conceded that Davis's sentence
"represent[ed] a 'grave disparity in sentencing' and that the continued incarceration of
Davis '[was] grossly unjust'." Id. at 711. Finally, in 1979, six years after Davis's conviction, the Virginia legislature reduced the maximum sentence with respect to each of Davis's offenses from _40 years to 10 years. Id.
24. 445 U.S. at 2'12-77.
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portionality of prison terms was fraught with such difficulties because too subjective or too complex211 or too much an interference with state autonomy118 - as to counsel against judicial review of decisions essentially within the legislative prerogative.
Yet these propositions appear flawed upon closer study; detailed
examination of the two basic strands of the Court's analysis in
Rummel, to which this Note now turns, reveals the flaws of the
decision and suggests the continued viability of proportionality
review of felony prison sentences.
II.

SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT APPLYING PROPORTIONALITY
STANDARDS

A.

Challenges to Sentence Length - Weems v. United
States

In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court entertained
eighth amendment challenges only in death penalty cases. 27 In
Weems v. United States, 18 however, the Court for the first time
applied eighth amendment analysis to a non-capital case. In
Weems, the defendant had been convicted in the Philippines29
of falsifying a public document. so The mandatory punishment
under Philippine law, cadena temporal, involved a composite of
25. Id. at 279-81.
26. Id. at 282-84.
27. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879) (finding execution by public
shooting to be constitutional). '.!'he nineteenth century cases focused not upon the constitutionality of the death penalty itself, but rather upon the legality of the execution
method. During this period, the Court had barred only torture or other barbarous penalties under the eighth amendment. See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)
("Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution.
It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life."). For the view that the English roots of the eighth amendment
indicate a greater concern for excessive rather than barbarous punishments, see Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969).
28. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The historical background of Weems is discussed extensively
in Comment, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical
Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 783 (1975).
29. At the time, the Philippines was a United States territory and thus came within
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
30. The offense embraced any entry of false information in a public record, "though
there be no one injured, though there be no fraud or purpose of it, no gain or desire of
it." 217 U.S. at 365.
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penalties. Confinement was for a minimum of twelve years, during which the prisoner would be chained and required to do
hard labor. In addition, a variety of accessory penalties were imposed: the prisoner lost all marital, parental, and property rights
during confinement, and remained under surveillance of a criminal magistrate for life. 81 The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant's argument that imposition of cadena temporal would
be grossly disproportionate to the offense of falsifying a public
document and declared the sentence unconstitutional as a violation of the eighth amendment. 81
Rummel attempted to draw upon Weems as support for his
contention that a prison sentence could be found violative of the
eighth amendment proportionality principle, arguing that cadena temporal had been found unconstitutional in part because
the length of the prison term alone was excessive. 88 In effect,
Rummel depicted Weems as establishing that a disproportionately long prison sentence - twelve years confinement for the
falsification of a document - could itself, without more, constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
The Rummel majority rejected this reading, however, observing that Weems could not "be applied without regard to its peculiar facts." 84 In the Court's view, Weems held merely that the
prison term and accessory penalties considered in combination
- not separately - imposed cruel and unusual punishment. 85
31. Id. at 364-66.
32. Id. at 377-78.
33. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 273 ("Rummel argues that the length of Weems' imprisonment was, by itaelf, a basis for the Court's decision").
34. These "peculiar facts" were "the triviality of the charged offense, the impressive
length of the minimum term of imprisonment, and the extraordinary nature of the 'accessories' included within the punishment of cadena temporal." Id. at 274.
By thus restricting Weems to its facts, the Court had departed from a series of decisions construing Weems as support for the general proposition that punishment would
be reviewed under eighth amendment proportionality principles. See, e.g., Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 393 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[Weems] is generally regarded as holding that a punishment may be excessively cruel within the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment because it is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime
...."); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 592 (1977); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 103 n.7 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
35. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 273 (Weems "consistently referred jointly to the length of
imprisonment and its 'accessories' or 'accompaniments'.").
To buttress its point that Weems _had considered the prison term and accessory punishments in tandem, the Rummel majority observed that the Weems Court had expressly
rejected the argument that "the provision for imprisonment in the Philippine Code is
separable from the accessory punishment, and that the latter may be declared illegal,
leaving the former to have application." 445 U.S. at 273-74 (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at
381-82). But it does not necessarily follow that the Weems Court did not consider the
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Rummel thus identified the accessories as essential to the constitutional defect in cadena temporal," concluding that Weems
had not found the prison sentence alone to be an eighth amendment violation. 87
This reading of Weems, however, seems far too narrow,18 and
disregards clear language to the contrary. In striking down the
statute imposing cadena temporal for falsification of public documents, the Weems Court found the penalty to be "cruel in its
excess of imprisonment and that which follows and accompanies
imprisonment."89 In this passage, therefore, the Court condemned cadena temporal because it found the penalty's component elements - separately stated - to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Furthermore, the Court observed that the
statute's "punishments come under the condemnation of the bill
of rights, both on account of their degree and kind. "'0 The refercombined punishments of cadena temporal individually, merely because it recognized
that Philippine law "unites the penaltiea of cadena temporal." The Court might well
have considered, and seemingly did consider, the elements of cadena temporal separately for purposes of eighth amendment analysis, even though recognizing it had no
power to fashion a remedy for the constitutional violation that distinguished the accessory penalties from the punishment. If the Court, in disposing of the case, had separated
the elements of cadena temporal, it would have abridged the manifeat intent of the Philippine legislature, which had mandated both the acceasory sanctions and the prison term
as punishment for Weems's offense. This legislative intent, however, had no bearing on
whether the Court approached the elements of codena temporal as analytically distinct
punishments. The Weems Court simply found itself powerleas to fashion a criminal penalty - such as imprisonment alone - unauthorized by the statute. See Weems, 217 U.S.
at 381-82 (" '(T]he general rule [is] that a judgment rendered by a court in a criminal
case must conform strictly to the statute, and that any variation from its provisions,
either in the character or the extent of punishment inflicted, renders the judgment absolutely void . . . .' ") (quoting /n re Graham, 138 U.S. 461, 462 (1891)). On this theory,
therefore, the Court, when confronted with an unconstitutional composite punishment,
had no alternative but to hold the entire penalty unconstitutional, rather than merely
one component.
36. See 445 U.S. at 274.
37. Id. at 273 ("Although Rummel arguea that the length of Weems' imprisonment
was, by itself, a basis for the Court's decision, the Court's opinion doea not support such
a simple conclusion.").
38. The Rummel majority is not alone, though, in viewing Weems as based upon a
combination of punishments. See Packer, Makin/I the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77
HARV. L. R.Ev. 1071, 1075 (1964) ("it was the combination of an eir:ceasive but conventional mode of punishment with a good deal of laid-on unpleasantness offensive for its
novelty as well as its severity that supported the characterization of Weems' punishment
as cruel and unusual"). But see 38 WASH. & LBB L. Rsv. 243, 251 (1981) ("the [Weems]
Court recognized that length of punishment alone can constitute cruel and unusual
punishment").
39. 217 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added). The Court has never directly decided whether
"unusual" is distinct from "cruel" for eighth amendment purposes. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 331 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); Trop v. Dullea, 356 U.S. 86, 100
n.32 (1958).
40. 217 U.S. at 377.
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ence to plural "punishments" strongly indicates that the Court
considered the constitutionality of the individual elements of
cadena temporal and found each constituent punishment - including the excessively harsh prison sentence - to be violative
of the eighth amendment. The Rummel majority, therefore, misread Weems, 41 which indeed represents good precedent for the
proposition Rummel sought to establish: a prison sentence
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense violates
the eighth amendment. 42

B. Proportionality and the Death Penalty Cases
Three major death penalty cases of the 1970's48 firmly estab41. Rummel also ignored Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), which suggested that
the length of incarceration may offend the Constitution. Regarding a prisoner's confinement in isolation, the Hutto Court commented: "[T]he length of confinement cannot be
ignored in deciding whether the confinement meets constitutional standards. A filthy,
overcrowded cell and a diet of 'gruel' might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably
cruel for weeks or months." Id. at 686-87.
42. Additional language in Weems provides further support for the conclusion that
the Court ruled on the constitutionality of the prison sentence alone. For instance, the
issue raised by the defendant on appeal related solely to whether 15 years imprisonment
was cruel and unusual punishment for falsifying a public record. 217 U.S. at 362. Furthermore, the Court, in its review of eighth amendment case law, cited McDonald v.
Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 322 (1899), which recognized that a disproportionately long
prison sentence might violate the Constitution, 217 U.S. at 368, and noted Justice Field's
dissent in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892), in which he remarked that the
eighth amendment prohibited "all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportionate to the offences charged." See also Hart v. Coiner, 483
F.2d 136, 140 (4th Cir. 1973) ("In Weems, the Court noticed, with apparent approval,
that the highest state court of Massachusetts had previously conceded the possibility
that 'punishment in the state prison for a long term of years might be so disproportionate to the offense as to constitute a cruel and unusual punishment'.") (quoting Weems,
217 U.S. at 368), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974).
43. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See generally Radin, supra
note 4.
In Furman, with each Justice filing a separate opinion, the Court struck down Georgia
and Texas death penalty statutes as violative of the eighth amendment. Several of the
Justices focused upon the death penalty as administered in concluding that these statutes inflicted cruel and unusual punishment: Justice Douglas felt the death penalty was
applied discriminatorily against a specific class of people; Justice Stewart found that the
penalty was administered so infrequently as to be "capricious"; and Justice White reasoned that the infrequency of executions made the death penalty ineffective in deterring
crime. In contrast, Justices Marshall and Brennan found the death penalty to be unconstitutional per se. In the view of Justice Marshall, the death penalty was unnecessarily
cruel because its admittedly legitimate ends could be achieved by less severe sanctions.
Justice Brennan - in addition to voicing the concerns of inconsistent administration
and the availability of less drastic alternatives to achieve the same objective - characterized the death penalty as not comporting with human dignity, because he found execution so severe as to degrade the prisoner.
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lished that the eighth amendment prohibits penalties grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime."' In addition to
Weems, Rummel relied on the death penalty cases to show that
the Court could find the prison term imposed upon him unconstitutional because disproportionate to his crime.n For two reasons, however, the Court refused to extend these precedents to
eighth amendment attacks on sentence length.
1. Distinguishing the death penalty from imprisonmentThe Court first found the principles announced in the death
penalty cases to be of "limited assistance" to Rummel because
"a sentence of death differs in kind from any sentence of imprisonment, no matter how long . . . ."'8 The majority relied upon
the distinctions between the death penalty and imprisonment
enunciated in Furman v. Georgia,., where Justice Stewart said
that death constituted a "unique" penalty because it (1) is irrevocable, (2) necessarily rejects rehabilitation of the convict as a
basic goal of criminal justice, and (3) renounces all that is embodied in society's concept of humanity.'8
The Court's analysis, however was unresponsive to the quesIn Gregg, the Court upheld the death penalty for murder. Justices Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens concluded that, because at least 35 states had reenacted the death penalty
after Furman, capital punishment should be considered neither excessively cruel nor disproportionate punishment in all circumstances, and should be recognized as serving valid
penological purposes. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, found that the Georgia statute met the Furman test because it was not administered in a discriminatory, standardless, or rare fashion. Justice Blackmun concurred in
the judgment without opinion, while Justices Brennan and Marshall retained their views
expressed in Furman.
The Court in Coker considered the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty for
the rape of an adult woman. Justice White, joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and
Stevens, found the death penalty grossly disproportionate for the crime of rape, in violation of the eighth amendment. Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in the judgment, citing their positions in Gregg that the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in all circumstances. Justice Powell agreed that the death penalty
would be disproportionate to the crime of rape where, as in Coker, there was no excessive
brutality or lasting harm to the victim, but disagreed with the plurality that the death
penalty would always be unconstitutional when im~ed for the crime of raping an adult
woman.
44. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("Under Gregg,
a punishment is 'excessive' and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless
and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime.").
45. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272 ("Rummel cites these ... opinions dealing with
capital punishment as compelling the conclusion that bis sentence is disproportionate to
bis offenses.").
46. Id.
47. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
48. Id. at 306 (Stewart J., concurring).
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tion presented by Rummel. Although Justice Stewart had indeed articulated salient features of the death penalty, for the
purposes of eighth amendment proportionality analysis these
features fail to distinguish the capital cases from cases involving
excessive prison sentences. First, Furman identified irrevocability as a factor making the death penalty unique. But, in fact,
both the death penalty and a prison sentence are, in the relevant
sense of the term, "irrevocable." The death penalty is irrevocable not because once pronounced it can never be rescinded; the
sentence can be commuted to life imprisonment, for example,
before the day of execution. Rather, the death penalty is irrevocable because once carried out it cannot be voided. A prison sentence is similarly irrevocable: a twenty-year sentence may be
shortened by parole, for instance, before being fully served. Once
the prisoner has served the term, however, the state can neither
shorten the sentence nor return the years of imprisonment.
Therefore, a prison sentence already served is fully as "irrevocable" as a death warrant already executed.
Justice Stewart in Furman identified a second "unique" element of the death penalty: it alone denies rehabilitation as an
objective of the criminal justice system. Yet this distinction,
while correct, lacks constitutional significance. Whether capital
punishment serves a rehabilitative purpose has never been dispositive of the eighth amendment issue. For example, the death
penalty, never rehabilitative, has been upheld as a constitutional
punishment for murder,49 but cruel and unusual punishment
when imposed on a rapist. 50 Indeed, the Constitution does not
require that a criminal penalty have a particular penological
goal, rehabilitative or otherwise. While the Constitution requires
punishment to have some penological objective,111 rehabilitation
is only one of several goals that would satisfy this requirement. 111
On this basis, therefore, imprisonment and the death penalty
cannot be distinguished; both serve valid, constitutional penological goals.
Finally, the third Furman factor relied upon by the Court in
Rummel to distinguish the death penalty cases was that only
capital punishment renounces the prisoner's humanity. Upon
49. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
50. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
51. See id. at 592. This is not the only constitutional requirement; the eighth amendment also forbids penalties grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Id.
52. The purposes of criminal sanction can be categorized as prevention, restraint, rehabilitation, education, and retribution. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON THE
CRIMINAL LAW § 5 (1972).
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closer examination, however, this factor appears to be a hollow
means upon which to draw a distinction; in various decisions, a
majority of the Justices seemingly have held that the death penalty per se does not deny the condemned person's humanity. 113
Thus, the third factor identified by the Rummel Court for differentiating capital punishment from imprisonment simply cannot
withstand scrutiny.
53. Justice Stewart seemingly derived the notion that the death penalty renounces
humanity from Justice Brennan's concurrence in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972). Justice Stewart's concurrence in Furman, however, did not rely upon the argument regarding renunciation of humanity; he classified this factor as being one of the
reasons why "at least two of [his] Brothers ... concluded that the infliction of the death
penalty is constitutionally impermissible in all circumstances," id. at 306, and then proceeded to concur on the basis that the death penalty had been "wantonly . . . and freakishly imposed," id. at 310.
For Justice Brennan, the eighth amendment commands fundamentally that punishment "comport with human dignity." Id. at 270. This means, in part, that the punishment must not be so severe that it "reflect[s] the attitude that the person punished is
not entitled to recognition as a fellow human being." Id. at 273; cf. id. at 272-73 ("The
true significance of [constitutionally prohibited barbaric] punishments is that they treat
members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded.").
A punishment's denial of the prisoner's humanity, therefore may result solely from its
severity. Justice Brennan found that "[d]eath is today an unusually severe punishment,
severe in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity." Id. at 287. Because of the severity
of capital punishment, he concluded, "the deliberate extinguishment of .human life by
the State is uniquely degrading to human dignity." Id. at 291; see also id. at 290 ("The
calculated killing of a human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of
the executed person's humanity.").
Several death penalty cases indicate, however, that at least five Justices would disagree
with Justice Brennan's conclusion that the severity of the penalty renders capital punishment a denial of the prisoner's humanity. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976),
Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens held that the death penalty is not excessively severe. They explicitly recognized that the eighth amendment requires that a "penalty . . .
must accord with 'the dignity of a man'," id. at 173, while agreeing that the death penalty is uniquely severe, id. at 187. Nevertheless, they refused to conclude that capital
punishment is impermissible in all circumstances, noting instead that "[i]t is an extreme
sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes." Id. By implication, therefore, Justices
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens disagreed with Justice Brennan that the severity of the
death penalty alone denies the humanity or dignity of the condemned person.
Two other Justices have reached a similar conclusion. Relying on his dissent in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (finding a mandatory death penalty statute to be
cruel and unusual punishment), Justice White concurred in Gregg, reasoning that the
death penalty is not always unconstitutional. See 428 U.S. at 226. In his Roberts dissent,
in which Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined, Justice
White concluded that the death penalty could not always be characterized as being so
excessively severe as to violate the Constitution. 428 U.S. at 353. Although the Roberts
dissent was not founded on the dignity-of-man theory, Justices White and Blackmun
appeared to embrace this theory in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1977) (opinion of White, J.), which found the death penalty unconstitutional as an excessive punishment for the rape of an adult woman. In light of Coker, these two Roberts dissenters
seemingly believe that the death penalty is not so inherently severe as to deny the condemned person's dignity. Consequently, at least five Justices would disagree with Justice
Brennan that the death penalty inherently renounces the prisoner's humanity.
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2. Drawing a "bright line" for proportionality analysis- Reference to the features compiled by Justice Stewart in Furman,
therefore, does not provide a satisfactory basis for distinguishing
the application of proportionality principles in the death penalty
cases from cases seeking judicial review of excessively harsh
prison sentences. The Rummel Court, however, alluded to a further argument that could differentiate capital punishment cases
from those involving imprisonment. As the Court phrased it, a
"bright line" can be drawn between the death penalty and all
other punishments;H no similarly sharp distinction exists between varying terms of imprisonment. The Court made clear its
desire to avoid a "slippery slope" along which principled lines
could not be drawn,u thus limiting itself to reviewing the proportionality of punishment only in an area seemingly susceptible
of clear constitutional distinction. 118 The Court perceived attempts by the judiciary to review prison sentences as impermissible, or at least ill-advised, "intrusion[s] into the basic linedrawing process that is preeminently the province of the legislature . . . . " 117
This argument may be attacked on two fronts. First, although
the death penalty differs in kind from other punishments - because it alone involves loss of life - this is irrelevant for purposes of applying the proportionality principle. Eighth amendment proportionality analysis compares the severity of punishment and crime. Thus, the capital cases involving eighth
amendment challenges that relied on the proportionality principle118 assessed the severity of the penalty - rather than the kind
of punishment - in relation to the offense involved. In Coker v.
Georgia, 119 for example, the Court held in effect that death was
too severe a punishment for the rape of an adult woman. For
purposes of applying the proportionality principle, therefore, the
death penalty differs from other punishments only in its degree
of severity; less severe punishments, such as prison sentences,
need not be excluded from consideration.
Second, the line-drawing problem inherent in constitutional
54. See 445 U.S. at 275.
55. For a discussion of "slippery slope" considerations, see Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and the Compelling Case of William Rummel, 71 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 378, 417-19 (1980).
56. But see supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text (arguing that no distinction
exists, for eighth amendment proportionality purposes, between the death penalty and
lesser criminal sanctions).
57. 445 U.S. at 275.
58. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
59. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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review of prison terms - but not the death penalty - does not
justify excluding imprisonment from proportionality consideration. Although arbitrary distinctions between differing terms of
years may be the inevitable result of judicial review of prison
sentences, the Court nonetheless can draw lines which afford
some measure of eighth amendment protection for felons punished by imprisonment. An analogy can be drawn concerning the
right to jury trial,60 where the Supreme Court recognized the
need to draw arguably arbitrary lines. Having previously upheld
a criminal conviction returned by a unanimous six-member
jury,61 the Court refused to sustain a unanimous five-member
jury conviction, even though a majority admitted it could not
discern a clear distinction between five- and six-person juries.62
Clearly, a refusal to draw an arbitrary line between varying jury
sizes could lead to erosion of the right to jury trial. Similarly, the
Court should not be deterred from distinguishing between constitutional and unconstitutional terms of years - if the alternative is to remove all prison sentences from eighth amendment
scrutiny.
Moreover, even accepting the premise that an arbitrary constitutional line between sentence lengths is unacceptable, the proportionality principle need not be abandoned altogether as
invariably producing arbitrary results. 69 Although some proportionality judgments may be arbitrary, this will not necessarily be
true of all such judgments. For example, a court, upon consideration of various factors,6" might find forty years imprisonment to
be a punishment grossly disproportionate to the offense of stealing a $100 coat. These same factors, however, may not tell the
60. The sixth amendment provides in part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
61. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
62. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978). In Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130
(1979), the Court considered a state statute permitting conviction by a six-member jury
on a 5-1 vote. The Court had previously upheld convictions by a unanimous six-member
jury, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), and by a non-unanimous twelve-member
jury, see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (finding convictions on 11-1 and 10-2
jury votes constitutional). The Court in Burch held unconstitutional the non-unanimous
vote of a six-member jury. Speaking for the Court, Justice Rehnquist noted that "lines
must be drawn somewhere if the substance of the jury trial right is to be preserved." 441
U.S. at 137.
63. See 445 U.S. at 275-76 ("to recognize that the State of Texas could have imprisoned Rummel for life if he had stolen $5,000, $50,000, or $500,000, rather than . . .
$120.75 . . ., is virtually to concede that the lines to be drawn are indeed 'subjective,'
and therefore properly within the province· of legislatures, not courts").
64. Before Rummel was decided, the state and lower federal courts had identified
several of these factors. See infra text accompanying notes 69-71.
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court whether a one-year difference in sentences - between, for
instance, nine and ten years - makes a constitutional difference. Faced with this decision, the court may find, arbitrarily,
that a nine- but not a ten-year sentence is constitutionally permissible. Yet the holding that a forty-year term for the theft imposed cruel and unusual punishment would remain a principled
decision, even if the court were forced into an arbitrary line on
the more difficult case.611 The arbitrariness of some proportionality decisions does not infect all others - and does not compel
wholesale abandonment of the proportionality doctrine.
Thus, the notion that the courts should engage in eighth
amendment proportionality review of criminal sanctions appears
equally applicable to the death penalty and to prison sentences.
Indeed, nothing in the capital punishment cases suggested that
the principles announced were not of general application;86 the
precedent seemingly provided authority for the Court to engage
in eighth amendment review of sentence length.

Ill.

THE PROPORTIONALITY TEST OF SENTENCE LENGTH

Aside from the question of whether Rummel could muster
precedential support for his position, the Court advanced a second major objection to judicial review of prison terms,87 focusing
on the flaws inherent in applying eighth amendment proportion65. The fears that proportionality review of prison sentences would deteriorate into a
wholly arbitrary process may in fact be unfounded. Dissenting in Rummel, Justice Powell observed that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - the last
bastion of proportionality oversight of sentence length - had managed workable standards for assessing whether prison terms violated the eighth amendment, without becoming hopelessly mired in indiscriminate linedrawing. See 445 U.S. at 304-06 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
66. The mode of analysis in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), is illustrative. The
Court first isolated general principles of eighth amendment analysis and then applied
these principles to the death penalty:
In the discussion to this point we have sought to identify the principles and
considerations that guide a court in addressing an Eighth Amendment claim. We
now consider specifically whether the sentence of death for the crime of murder
is a per se violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution.
Id. at 176 (emphasis added). The Rummel dissent also noted that the "principle of disproportionality has been acknowledged to apply to both capital and noncapital
sentences." 445 U.S. at 293 (Powell, J., dissenting).
67. The Rummel Court did not expressly address itself to the proportionality test per
se. But the Court clearly responded to the arguments advanced by Rummel that were
intended to show the disproportionality of his life prison sentence. See 445 U.S. at 27475, 279-81, 282-84; see also Hutto v. Davis, 102 S. Ct. 705 n.2 (1982) (per curiam)
(describing Rummel as disapproving of each factor of the proportionality test).
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ality principles to assess the constitutionality of specific sentences. Before Rummel, eighth amendment challenges to felony
prison terms, arguing that the punishment was grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime, had been considered frequently68 and sustained occasionally in the state and lower federal courts. 69 These courts had refined the proportionality
principle into a three-part test, 70 assessing whether a prison
term violated the eighth amendment by considering (1) the nature and gravity of the offense, (2) a comparison of the punishment imposed with penalties for other crimes in the jurisdiction,
and (3) a comparison of the punishment imposed with penalties
for the same crime in other jurisdictions.71 Rummel argued that
these factors demonstrated the disproportionality of his prison
sentence. But the Court found the test an inappropriate vehicle
for considering whether terms of imprisonment transgressed
eighth amendment limits on punishment. The Court concluded
that the test relied too heavily upon subjective considerations
best left to the legislature,71 and that it entailed complex judgments73 intruding heavily upon state autonomy in matters of
68. See, e.g., United States v. Faleafine, 492 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1974) (50-year sentence
for kidnapping does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); McDonald v. Arkansas, 501 F.2d 385 (8th Cir.) (eighth amendment not violated by a 30-year sentence imposed for forcible rape), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1004 (1974); Yeager v. Estelle, 489 F.2d
276 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (500-year prison term for murder did not inflict cruel
and unusual punishment), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 908 (1974); Guerro v. Fitzpatrick, 436
F.2d 378 (1st Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (three consecutive 9- to 10-year terms for the offense of receiving stolen motor vehicles did not violate the eighth amendment); United
States v. Collins, 432 F.2d 1136 (7th Cir. 1970) (8-year prison sentence for the unlawful
transportation of stolen firearms was not cruel and unusual punishment), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1011 (1971); United States v. Overton, 359 F.2d 28 (4th Cir. 1966) (eighth
amendment was not violated by a 3-month sentence imposed for the willful failure to file
federal income tax returns); see also Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 335 (1970).
69. See cases cited supra note 3.
70. See generally Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
983 (1974); White, Disproportionality and the Death Penalty: Death as Punishment for
Rape, 38 U. PITT. L. REv. 145, 150-58 (1977); Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of
Imprisonment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1119 (1979).
71. The test is intended to be cumulative, with each element checking the accuracy of
the others. See Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 140 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
983 (1974).
72. 445 U.S. at 274-75. Ironically, courts had employed the proportionality test to
minimize subjectivity in the judicial process. See, e.g., Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405,
409 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1091 (1979); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 140
(4th Cir. 1973) ("there are several objective factors which are useful in determining
whether the sentence in this case is constitutionally disproportionate"), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 983 (1974). One court has suggested that the proportionality test improves upon the
"subjective evaluation which looks to the extent to which the conscience of the court is
shocked by punishments imposed." People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 111, 332 N.E.2d
338, 342, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 476, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 950 (1975).
73. 445 U.S. at 279-81.
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criminal justice.74 In fact, however, the Court's objections to the
proportionality test are not persuasive; as the following analysis
demonstrates, courts interpreting state constitutional prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment should not be dissuaded
from applying proportionality analysis by the concerns advanced
in Rummel.
A.

The Gravity of the Offense

As a first proposition, a court considering whether a prison
term imposes cruel and unusual punishment must assess the
gravity of the offense; a harsh penalty for a relatively trivial offense may suggest disproportionality. In their efforts to evaluate
objectively the gravity of the offense at issue, some courts have
considered whether the crime was violent or otherwise against
the person711 - in effect distinguishing the gravity of crimes by
the presence of violence. Indeed, Rummel urged that his crimes
were "petty" because none were against the person. 76 The Court
rejected this approach, finding violence to be inadequate as an
indication of the gravity of an offense. 77 For instance, noted the
Court, a corporate officer accepting a bribe would commit a seri- ·
ous, albeit nonviolent, crime. 78
The Court properly criticized the approach of those courts
employing violence as a proxy for the gravity of offenses. The
proportionality test itself, however, remains intact; several
courts have measured the gravity of a crime, not by reference to
the violence involved, but by considering the degree of harm the
criminal act causes society. 79 Under this approach, the gravity of
74. Id. at 282-84.
75. See, e.g., Hall v. McKenzie, 537 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1976); Hart v. Coiner, 483
F.2d 136, 140 (4th Cir. 1973) ("In assessing the nature and gravity of an offense, courts
have repeatedly emphasized the element of violence and danger to the person."), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974).
76. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275.
77. Id. at 275, 282 n.27.
78. Id. at 275.
79. See, e.g., People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 112, 332 N.E.2d 338, 342, 371
N.Y.S.2d 471, 476 ("In assessing the gravity of a criminal offense, the primary consideration is the harm it causes to society."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 950 (1975); In re Lynch, 8
Cal. 3d 410,431, 503 P.2d 921, 935, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 231 (1972) (the annoyance caused
by indecent exposure "is not a sufficiently grave danger to society to warrant the heavy
punishment of a life-maximum sentence"); see also Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405 (2d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1091 (1979).
Although these courts have not discussed the point, what constitutes "harm" to society
may vary among crimes; for instance, the harm caused by passing a bad check differs
from the harm caused by murder. The distinctions flow, of course, from the varied socie-
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an offense turns on the injury inflicted upon society, thus minimizing judicial subjectivity. The assessment of the harm caused
society involves a factual inquiry, at least to some extent, and a
reviewing court may rely on empirical studies, where available,
to determine the scope of the injury occasioned by the crime.
One court, for example, utilized various government reports in
assessing the harm to society engendered by narcotics sales. 80
Another court, reviewing a one-year-to-life sentence for secondoffense indecent exposure, drew from clinical studies of the damage· inflicted upon the victims of exhibitionist displays. 81 Where
such studies do not exist, the court could consider expert testimony or other documentation regarding the extent of harm
caused by a particular crime. Of course, if such evidence is lacking or inconclusive, the court would be free to find, based upon
the gravity of the offense, that the defendant has not been subjected to an unconstitutionally disproportionate sentence.
Although objective evidence can never precisely measure the
gravity of various offenses, the court need not fix the crime's seriousness with precision. The proportionality principle prohibits
only penalties grossly disproportionate to the crime. A court
must only estimate the range of gravity within which the crime
falls; vast differences between that range and the severity of the
sentences imposed indicate gross disproportionality. In this limited inquiry, courts have sufficient guidance to ensure results not
bottomed merely upon judges' subjective impressions.

B. Intrajurisdictional Comparisons
In addition to weighing the severity of punishment against the
gravity of the offense, a court applying the proportionality test
also will compare the sentence imposed on the defendant against
the penalties levied for other crimes - particularly far more serious crimes - in the jurisdiction. 82 Gross disproportionality, in
violation of the eighth amendment, will be suggested if these
other crimes are subject to lesser sanctions than those imposed
on the defendant. Thus, a court might conclude that a thirtytal interests threatened by these criminal acts. Passing a bad check impinges upon society's interest in the security of private property, whereas murder threatens physical
security.
80. See People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 332 N.E.2d 338, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 950 (1975).
81. See In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 821, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
82. See, e.g., Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 142 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
983 (1974).
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year sentence for the possession and sale of a small amount of
marijuana is grossly disproportionate, in part because armed
robbery and forcible rape are punished by a maximum sevenyear term in the same jurisdiction.88
This portion of the proportionality test assumes a reviewing
court's competence to choose among the severity of offenses
within the jurisdiction. Unless a court can adjudge that rape is
more serious than the sale of marijuana, for instance, it will be
unable to rely upon the maximum term for rapists in finding
that a thirty-year sentence inflicts cruel and unusual punishment upon the seller of marijuana. In Rummel, however, the
Court suggested that such distinctions between the severity
of crimes would necessarily be flawed because lacking in
objectivity. 84
The Court identified two rationales supporting this thesis.
First, it found that comparing the gravity of crimes is an "inherently speculative" task.H Each crime, the Court reasoned,
threatens a "unique" group of social values defined by the legislature and not susceptible of being grouped with other offenses. 88 With no shared underlying values or interests, there exists no basis for comparing the gravity of any two crimes.
Although different crimes indeed may threaten different social
interests, the position that each crime is "unique" and not comparable with others seems extreme. If each crime were truly
unique, the gravities of murder and assault, for example, could
not be compared: a court could not assert that murder is more
serious than assault. This result, however, runs contrary both
to common sense and to decisions such as Coker v. Georgia, 87
where four Justices found murder to be a more serious offense
than rape. 88 Thus, the premise that crimes are entirely unique
83. See, e.g., Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir.), vacated, 423 U.S. 993 (1975).
84. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275.
85. Id. at 282 n.27.
86. Id.
87. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
88. See id. at 598 (rape is not as serious as murder because "rape by definition does
not include the death of or even the serious injury to another person"). For a criticism of
the Court's argument, see Note, Coker v. Georgia: Disproportionate Punishment and the
Death Penalty for Rape, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 1714, 1719-20 (1978).
Similarly, other courts have found the eighth amendment to be violated by the imposition of a greater punishment upon a lesser included offense of the same sort. See Roberts
v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1976) (where maximum penalty for assault with intent
to kill is 15 years, a prison sentence of 20 years for each count of assault inflicts cruel
and unusual punishment), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 973 (1977); Cannon v. State, 203 Or.
629, 281 P.2d 233 (1955) (life imprisonment for assault with intent to commit rape violates the eighth amendment, where the maximum penalty for rape is 20 years).
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and incomparable must be rejected.
The Rummel Court's second, related argument against comparing the punishments for other crimes within a particular jurisdiction is open to similar objections. The Court reasoned that
intrajurisdictional comparisons were suspect because "rational
people could disagree as to which criminal merits harsher punishment."89 Indeed, this may be true to some extent: rational
people could disagree concerning whether an embezzler of bank
funds merits harsher punishment than an armed robber making
off with a smaller amount of money90 - but no rational person
would maintain that murder constitutes a less serious offense
than assault. Again, the Court's argument proves too much.
Nonetheless, the Court's second objection to intrajurisdictional comparisons does suggest a genuine problem with this aspect of the proportionality test. A judicial determination of the
relative severity of two crimes may be rationally controvertible
because it relies more on the judge's personal values and experience than on recognized principle. Such "subjective" determinations would be most likely if a court were to engage in subtle
comparisons between offenses; for instance, a judge who decides
that assault with intent to kill is more serious than kidnapping
makes a subtle and suspiciously subjective judgment. A reviewing court, therefore, when administering the second element of
the proportionality test, must refrain from making overly refined
determinations regarding the relative severity of compared
offenses.
Rummel itself provides a useful standard for determining acceptable judgments of the relative gravity of offenses. A judicial
judgment of the gravity of an offense relative to other crimes
punished in the jurisdiction is acceptable only if rational people
would not dispute that judgment. Such a restriction upon courts
applying proportionality analysis would prevent subtle, overdrawn distinctions between constitutionally acceptable levels of
punishment, while enabling eighth amendment review of prison
sentences within the realm of judicial competency.

C. Interjurisdictional Comparisons
The third element of the proportionality test calls for a reviewing court to compare the sentence at issue with the penalties imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. Contem89.
90.

445 U.S.· at 282 n.27.

See id.
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porary attitudes - reflected by the sentencing patterns among
the states91 - regarding the proper level of punishment thus inform the constitutional judgment.92 A challenged penalty far in
excess of nationwide practices, therefore, would conflict with
contemporary values, suggesting disproportionate punishment in
violation of the eighth amendment.
The Rummel Court expressed concern that such comparisons
would unduly interfere with state autonomy in the administration of criminal justice. The Court reasoned that to infer constitutional disproportionality in part from interjurisdictional comparisons would presume "a constitutionally imposed uniformity"
among the states. 98 This "uniformity," the Court posited, would
prevent any state from punishing particular crimes more severely than other states - thereby inducing restraints on state
policies that would be "inimical to traditional notions of
federalism. " 94
The Court, however, misunderstands the constitutional significance of a disparity between a particular prison sentence and
prevailing practice among the states. Not every such disparity
suggests disproportionality;911 the Constitution prohibits only
grossly disproportionate penalties, so that only punishment far
91. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 (1976) ("The most marked indication of society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative response
to Furman.").
The Rummel majority, however, questioned a court's competence to define adequately
the relevant sentencing pattern. The Court noted several "complexities confronting any
court that would attempt [an interjurisdictional] comparison," although these "complexities" were not "inherent flaws" in the interjurisdictional analysis. 445 U.S. at 281. For a
discussion of this argument, see infra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
92. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 378 (1910).
93. 445 U.S. at 282.
94. Id. The Court, however, has found "national practice" to be a suitable objective
measure of at least one other constitutional standard. In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.
66 (1970) (plurality opinion), the Court held that a defendant charged with a crime punishable by more than six months imprisonment had a sixth amendment right to jury
trial. The Court found that every court except those of New York City, where the defendant was convicted, permitted a jury trial on charges of crimes punishable by sentences
longer than six months. Speaking for the plurality, Justice White remarked that the
"near uniform judgment of the Nation" was an "objective criterion by which a line could
. . . be drawn" around offenses that would be regarded as sufficient to invoke the defendant's right to jury trial. Id. at 72-73.
95. A particular sentence should withstand scrutiny so long as at least a significant
number of the states impose equivalent or more severe punishment for the same crime.
See Hall v. McKenzie, 537 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1976) (10- to 20-year sentence for
nonforcible rape of a 13-year-old female equivalent to or less than the penalties imposed
by 16 states and District of Columbia for the same crime; sentence held constitutional
under the eighth amendment).
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exceeding nationwide ~orms 96 would run afoul of the eighth
amendment. Consequently, the interjurisdictional comparison
• permits a wide diversity of approaches among the states, recognizing the states' considerable - but not unlimited - freedom
to punish felons according to their own standards. 97
In addition to its desire to avoid intrusions upon state functions, the Rummel Court identified several practical "complexities" presented by interjurisdictional analysis. First, the Court
expressed misgivings about how to treat statutes in other states
that had provisions similar but not identical to the statute under
which the defendant was sentenced. 98 For example, Rummel had
been prosecuted under a Texas recidivism statute mandating a
life sentence for anyone convicted of three felonies. The Court
noted, however, that other states impose a mandatory sentence
upon recidivists after four rather than three felony convictions,
or require the defendant to have committed at least one "violent" felony, or entrust the decision to the judge or jury whether
to impose a life sentence upon the recidivist. 99 The Court con96. It is difficult to define precisely when a penalty greatly exceeds nationwide practice. Diversity in sentencing practices among the states is a justifiable result of our pluralistic society. Nevertheless, where the national pattern is not a relatively continuous
gradation from the less severe to the most severe penalty, a national trend will appear.
Although courts should tolerate substantial diversity, they should hold disproportionate
those practices that do not represent reasonably expected variations on the national
trend. See, e.g., In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972)
(defendant's sentence of one-year-to-life for second offense of indecent exposure would
have been imposed by only two other states, the remaining states punishing the crime
with "a short jail sentence and/or a small fine").
97. One court has also argued that the severity of a punishment should match the
magnitude of the state's problem with the crime - rather than the gravity of the crime
itself. See Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1091
(1979). The penalties imposed by other states and interjurisdictional comparisons, consequently, would have no significance: "If the punishment must fit the crime, the legislature must look at the crime as found in its own borders and the action of states faced
with drug problems of lesser magnitude are of little importance." Id. at 415.
This view, however, is inconsistent with the proportionality principle. The eighth
amendment instructs that a penalty is unconstitutional if grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime, not to the severity of the state's problem with the crime. Thus, a
harsh penalty for a petty crime would be prohibited by the proportionality principle
even if the incidence of the crime reached epidemic levels. Judge Oakes, for example,
dissenting in Carmona, recognized that, besides the defendant's crime of drug trafficking, "New York also has [possibly] more serious traffic in stolen securities and counterfeit money and more income tax, nursing home and welfare fraud than other states, but
if these facts were true they would not justify disproportionately higher sentences for
those crimes." Id. at 424 (Oakes, J., dissenting). In the words of Justice Marshall, the
high incidence of motor vehicle theft and larceny in New York "could not insulate Draconian penalties for such offenses from constitutional challenge." Carmona v. Ward, 439
U.S. 1091, 1102 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
98. See 445 U.S. at 279-80.
99. Id.
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eluded that it would be difficult "to evaluate the position of any
particular recidivist scheme within [this] complex matrix." 100
Upon closer examination, however, the difficulty disappears.
The constitutionally significant questions are whether and to
what extent Rummel would have been treated more harshly by
these alternative recidivist statutes. These questions, directed at
the Court's illustrations, are answered easily. A statute requiring
four felonies for mandatory life imprisonment would not have
imposed that sentence upon a defendant who, like Rummel, had
committed only three felonies. Nor would a statute requiring a
"violent" felony have imposed such a sentence on Rummel, who
committed only felonious property offenses. In contrast, the
statute leaving sentencing decisions to the judge or jury is arguably no less harsh than the Texas law, because it would expose
the defendant to the same maximum penalty. The important
point, though, is that differences between the Texas habitual offender provisions and these other statutes could readily be perceived. These differences might be "subtle rather than gross" 101
- and thus not indicative of disproportionality - but they certainly could be subjected to eighth amendment scrutiny.
The Court noted a further complexity in comparing recidivism
statutes: not all states offer a parole possibility. 102 Unlike Texas,
Mississippi, for instance, imposes a life sentence without parole
upon the third felony conviction. 108 Yet, the Court did not make
clear how the need to distinguish between recidivism statutes
having differing parole alternatives would "complicate" the interjurisdictional analysis. Simply stated, the possibility for parole would be another - perhaps major - factor in comparing
the harshness of punishments among jurisdictions. 104 This would
seemingly be a simple rather than complicated comparison. 1011
100. Id. at 280.
101. Id. at 279.
102. Id. at 280-81.
103. Id. at 281.
104. See Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 660 (5th Cir. 1978) (suggesting that the
possibility for parole can mitigate the harshness of a prison sentence), aff'd, 445 U.S. 263
(1980). For discussion regarding whether the likelihood of parole should be considered in
eighth amendment proportionality analysis, see Schwartz, supra note 55, at 414-17; 19
DuQ. L. REv. 167, 177 (1980); 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 525, 538 (1980); 38 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 243, 253 (1981).
105. The only complication, in fact, arises from Rummel's vague pronouncements on
the weight to be given a parole possibility in assessing the severity of a statutory sentence. On the one hand, because there is no right to parole, the Court acknowledged that
Rummel's life sentence, despite the possibility for parole, could not be considered
"equivalent to a sentence of 12 years." 445 U.S. at 280. On the other hand, the Court did
not treat Rummel's punishment as a sentence for life. See id. at 268, 281. The severity of
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Finally, the Court identified the "variable" of "prosecutorial
discretion" as making interjurisdictional comparisons even more
difficult, pointing out that prosecutors often exercise discretion
in eliminating truly "petty" offenders from the literal scope of
an habitual offender statute. The flexibility induced by such discretion, however, should not complicate the analysis. 108 The
Court apparently assumed that most, if not all, recidivist
schemes invest the prosecutor with discretion in invoking the
statute. 107 But for purposes of interjurisdictional analysis, the
relevant inquiry should be into societal expectations, as embodied in the criminal statutes, regarding the proper punishment for
a given offense; prevailing community attitudes will be controlling, rather than the individual instance where a prosecutor
might screen out a trivial case.
CONCLUSION

Judicial involvement in reviewing statutorily mandated criminal punishment reflects the recognition that legislatures will not
always adhere to the limitations established by the eighth
Rummel's sentence, therefore, must lie somewhere between 12 years and life. The Court,
however, gave no guidance as to the strength of the parole factor in assessing the sentence's severity. The majority provided no more guidance than to observe that a court
"could hardly ignore the possibility that he [Rummel] will not actually be imprisoned for
the rest of his life." Id. at 281.
106. The Court's chief concern may have been that Rummel's "entire criminal record" would have been introduced in new proceedings if Rummel's life sentence were
deemed unconstitutional. See id. at 281. Because the likely result would be the discovery
of additional felony convictions, see supra note 10, the Court wondered "whether [the
sentencing] court could then sentence Rummel to life imprisonment even though his
recidivist status based on only three felonies had been held to be a 'cruel and unusual'
punishment." Id. Thus, it could be argued that "the Court upheld the sentence at least
in part for fear that if it did not, the recidivist statute for any number of felonies greater
than three would have been rendered ineffectual." Comment, Rummel v. Estelle: Leaving the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in Constitutional Limbo, 15 VAL. U.L.
REV. 201, 225 (1980). This fear, however, appears unfounded. Rummel challenged the
statute as applied to his three particular property offenses, 445 U.S. at 270-71; he did not
dispute the state's authority to impose the life sentence for only three felonies, but for
three specific felonious property offenses. Consequently, any holding striking down
Rummel's punishment would have left the state courts free to impose the sanctions of
the recidivist statute upon proof of three (or more) egregious felonies. If the Court had
overturned Rummel's life sentence based upon the commission of three felonious property offenses, a sentencing court nonetheless would have retained the constitutional authority to reimpose a life sentence upon Rummel if, for example, his record had included
three felony convictions for armed robbery.
107. 445 U.S. at 281 ("It is a matter of common knowledge that prosecutors often
exercise their discretion in invoking recidivist statutes or in plea bargaining so as to
screen out truly 'petty' offenders who fall within the literal terms of such statutes.").
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amendment. Courts should not abdicate this essential function
when confronted with challenges to felony prison terms - effectuation of the· constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires nothing less than uncompromising
judicial review. The Supreme Court's decision in Rummel to jettison proportionality review of sentence length remains unpersuasive; state courts should preserve an area within their own
constitutional law that would afford relief to defendants such as
William Rummel.

-Thomas F. Cavalier

